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Ethics and Animals collects 27 
essays which were originally presented 
at a 1979 conference held at Virginia 
Tech. It featut~es important articles 
by well-known thinkers who set out 
broadly dr~awn rationales or critiques 
of "animal liberation" positions. It 
also contains some interesting, more 
finely foctjsed analyses of particular 
concepts and claims that are involved 
in animal ethics discussions. A par­
ticularly interesting feature of the 
text is the contribution of nonphiloso­
phers: there are interesting studies 
of ape language research, stress lev­
els encountered by chickens in inten­
sive rearing, an account of the legal 
handling of a literal case of animal 
liberation-the freeing of two captive 
dolphins from an Hawaiian research 
institute-and a vademecum for animal 
rights activists. 
An nette c. Baier's "Fi ndi ng Ou r 
Pla,ce in the An imal World" is a pa rtic­
ularly valuable instance of the first 
class of contributions to the book. It 
comments usefully on an earlier essay, 
Jan Narveson's "Animal Rights Revi­
sited" (this sort of cross reference 
happens often in the text, and is one 
of its happiest features). Narveson's 
paper sketches the three moral theo­
ries he regards as most interest­
ing-libertarianism, utilitarianism, and 
cont racta ria n ism-a nd concl udes that 
only util ita rian ism provides any sup­
port for the kinds of claims animal 
·Iiberationists typically make, and that 
even that support is much weaker and 
more equivocal than many believe. 
Now, the problem of determining just 
what implications utilitarianism has for 
our treatment of animals is much 
discussed; see, for example, the 
exchange between Peter Singer and 
Tom Regan in Philosophy & Public 
Affairs for 1980, and R. G. Frey's 
I~ecent Rights,. Killing and Suffering. 
But Baier's focus is on what must 
sur~ely be a fairly common response to 
Narveson's claim that the other~ theo­
r~ies-libertarianism and contractarian­
ism-leave animals out in the cold. 
Such a result will seem to many (at 
least in some moods) to be profoundly 
cou nteri ntu itive. If such theories 
al~en't refuted by their neglect of ani­
mais, they must be at least profoundly 
emba rrassed. 
Baier notes that, along with what 
might be called "pro-animal" intui­
tions, there are certainly "anti-animal" 
intu ition s as well, ones that a re not at 
all disturbed by the massive exploita­
tion of animals. The question is, how 
should we sort out which set of intui­
tions are suitable for assessing con­
tending moral theories? 
Her article ta kes the view that 
"pro-animal" intuitions are less likely 
to be tainted by special interest and 
dogmatism than are their anti-animal 
competitors, and that there is a 
theory, one unconsidered by Narve­
son, wh ich nicely accommodates these 
intuitions. The remainder of the arti­
cle explores what might be the payoff 
for animals of such a view, a Humean­
style virtue ethics. 
Discussions of vi rtue ethics have 
b'een prominent lately-at least since 
Alasdair Macintyre's After Virtue. 
But the few attempts I have seen to 
apply such approaches to questions of 
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animal ethics have been disappoint­
ingly obscure. Baief~'s clear account 
of the boundaries of such an orienta­
tion is thus all the more valuable. I 
have often found something implausible 
in attempts to downplay the signifi­
cance of virtues such as "kindness in 
considef'ing the casuistry of human­
animal relations; Tom Regan's oft-made 
claim (occur'ring in "Animal Rights, 
Human Wrongs," his contribution to 
this volume) that it is not enough to 
encourage kindness to animals, 
because such a vi rtue is a matter of 
motivation and understanding, not 
action, has always seemed a bit too 
"quick for me. An animal researcher 
exploring, say, the nature of pain by 
harming unanaesthetized animals might 
be a kind person, but could such a 
person be at all plausibly descf'ibed as 
being kind to animals? Perhaps so, 
but the idea cou Id stand more exami­
nation than it's gotten. Given the 
extent of intuitions Pf'oscf~ibing cru­
elty and pr'escribing kindness to ani­
mals, the pr'actical implications could 
well be considerable. It is that sort 
of work that Baier's piece might 
encou rage. 
Recent discussions of animal ethics 
have contribututed to issues of gen­
eral moral import as well. One of 
these concer'ns the criteria necessary 
for a being to have a right to life. 
Edward Johnson's "Life, Death and 
Animals" defends the view that the 
mere possession of simple conscious­
ness is sufficient to confer a right to 
life (if anything is), because none of 
the attempts to isolate a morally 
nonarbitrary "line of demarcation" 
between simple consciousness and 
r'eflexive consciousness work. Dale 
jamieson's "Killing Persons and Other 
Beings" argues that the possession of 
simple consciousness gives its subject 
a prima facie right to life, since con­
sciousness itself is good. 
Like Baier, jamieson comments on 
the wOf'k of his co-symposiasts. He 
103 
finds johnson's contribution correct in 
conclusion but murky in argument. 
The difficulty seems to be that, while 
johnson may have successfully shown 
that even non reflex ively conscious 
animals may well have a "derived 
interest" in life, there is no argument 
showing that we ought to respect that 
derived interest. Simply having an 
interest in something, as jamieson 
quite reasonably points out, is not 
enough to entitle one to that thing. 
But this critique seems to mistake the 
direction of johnson's paper. As I 
read him, he is not so much showi ng 
that animals possessing simple con­
sciousness do have a right to life; 
rather, he is undermining our confi­
dence in our ability to point to the 
reason why animals fail to have the 
kind of right to life that we enjoy. 
jam ieson 's own arg ument seems to en d 
up having the same sort of problem he 
accuses johnson of suffering from-that 
is, the lack of a satisfactory accou nt 
of why the ha rm that death is sup­
posed to be to a creatu re of simple 
consciousness is morally significant. 
jamieson argues that consciousness is 
something that we prefer indepen­
dently of its contents. Accepti ng th is 
view explains our tendencies to disap­
prove of euthanasia for the slightly 
unhappy, and to approve of being 
awake and somewhat depressed as 
opposed to being simply unconscious. 
But, unless Jamieson is willing to 
countenance unfelt pr'eferences, it is 
difficult to see the import of this for 
the simply conscious. For it woul"d 
seem ex hypothesi that they entertain 
no preference for consciousness, since 
consciousness is not something of 
which they are aware. I suppose one 
might counter this by saying that 
consciousness is not good because it 
is preferred; rather, it is preferred 
because it is good. If that's so, then 
the moral theory operating here is not 
p reference uti Iita ria n ism, but rather a 
direct intrinsic good consequentialism. 
But the article does not show why 
consciousness is intrinsically good for 
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. one who is unaware of it; rather, it headed. Now, this may well be tt·ue. 
argues that since we complexly con­- But the difficulty is that no one, to 
scious beings prefer consciousness to my knowledge-certainly not Fox-has 
nonconsciousness, it is good for sim­- shown that it is true, much less gone 
ple beings to be conscious rather than on to show how things ought to be 
nonconscious. This doesn't seem handled. Part of the problem here, 
obviously true, anyway. One might of cout·se, may be that the typical 
perhaps regard their simple con- philosopher's standards of what con­-
sciousness as a derived good, given stitutes "showing that something is 
its relation to things that animals so" at·e part of the problem. My own 
actually experience as good, but then hope is that as the received methodol­-
we are back with Jamieson's criticism ogies continue to be challenged-as, 
of his reading of Johnson: why should for example, feminist philosophy con­-
we worry about such derived goods? ti n ues to matu re-they may bri ng us to 
a better sense of the ovet·all sound­-
Ethics and Animals contains sev- ness of ou r typical goals and methods, 
eral essays by nonphilosophers. My This is a huge job, but I can't see 
general view of these efforts is that that anything in Fox's article gets us 
when they address topics that are any forwarder on it. 
eth ically relevant but do not actually 
make arguments about ethical issues But these last comments are not 
or ethical methodology, they are intended to deprecate the importance 
extremely useful and interesting. of nonphilosophical contributions to 
When, on the other hand, they engage our understanding of our duties to 
in philosophy, they are uneven. animals. The task of applying ethics 
Michael W. Fox's "Ph ilosophy, Ecol­- is inherently an integrative one; you 
ogy, Animal Welfare, and the 'Rights' need to have you r facts straight as 
Question" is another of a series of badly as you need clear concepts and 
announcements which one hears rather defensible values. Ethics and Animals 
often today, to the effect that the performs an important service by col­-
way philosophers tend to go about lecting such valuable contributions to 
th ings is just a Itogether wrong- all these areas. 
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